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LOUISIANA CONFLICTS OF LAW-TORTS AND WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION
In the area of torts law, the Louisiana rule in conflict of laws
cases has been that the law of the place of the wrong governs the
rights and liabilities of the parties. The theory underlying lex loci
delicti was that if the law of the state where the wrong was committed
granted a cause of action to the injured party, that right could be
enforced in the courts of another state. However, if the law of the
state of the injury did not recognize an actionable wrong, no other
state was considered competent to create a cause of action., The
argument favoring lex loci delicti was its certainty and ease of appli-
cation; however, the rule drew widespread criticism for sacrificing
justice for expediency.' In many cases the state where the tort was
committed had no other contact with the parties than that one acci-
dental occurrence; thus, the application of lex loci delicti was gov-
erned by mere chance. In recent years the rule has been abandoned
in many jurisdictions as well as by the Restatement (Second).3 How-
ever, until the 1973 case of Jagers v. Royal Indemnity Co., 4 the
Louisiana supreme court had steadfastly refused to discard lex loci
delicti. The Jagers case orders a complete reversal of much of Louis-
iana's prior conflicts cases, and the spirit of the opinion portends even
wider effects upon the jurisprudence.
1. Lex loci delicti was adopted by the Restatement of Conflict of Laws which
looked to the law of the place of the wrong to determine whether a legal injury had
been sustained, as well as for any specific limitations on an actor's standard of care,
and all rights arising from wrongful death actions. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
§ 378-90 (1934).
2. Reviewing the multitude of criticisms, one writer has summarized them as
maintaining that "it [lex loci delicti] applied the law of one state ... with complete
disregard for the . . . purposes of the competing laws; there is no reason . . . why the
place of the tort is more significant than some other reference points . . .; the place
of the tort obviously can be quite fortuitous and irrelevant to the issue being litigated,
and its application thus producing rather perverse results . . . .Further the purpose
of uniformity is to enable parties to plan transactions . ..[and] such planning and
predictability are not so relevant to torts, because the place of the tort cannot be
anticipated." Couch, Choice-of-Law, Guest Statutes, and the Louisiana Supreme
Court: Six Judges in Search of a Rulebook, 45 TUL. L. REV. 100, 105 (1970).
3. The introductory note to the subject of torts criticized the Restatement because
"[slituations arise where the state of the last event (place of injury) bears only a slight
relationship to the occurrence and the parties with respect to the particular issue." The
Restatement (Second) adopted a more realistic policy which is summarized as the
principle that : "The rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue in tort
are determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to that issue, has the
most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties . RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 (1969).
4. 276 So. 2d 309 (La. 1973).
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Lex Loci Delicti- The Foreign Cause of Action
Prior to Jagers, Louisiana courts had held that in tort cases the
substantive law of the place of the wrong should govern the legal
rights of the parties.5 This rule was followed even in cases involving
only Louisiana domiciliaries who would have had a cause of action
under Louisiana law.' Particularly harsh results followed in Louisiana
cases in which a wife was barred from suing her husband's insurer for
injuries received through his negligence because the state where she
was injured did not grant her a cause of action.' Perhaps the denial
by a state of a cause of action in such circumstance is the result of a
desire to prevent collusive suits or to promote marital harmony by
preventing suit by one spouse against the other. Such a purpose
should be respected in the courts of the state when that state's citi-
zens are involved. However, it is senseless to apply that state's law
to Louisiana citizens in a Louisiana suit simply because the accident
occurred out of state. The other state has no interest in the incident
other than being the place of the injury, and certainly lacks any
interest in the marital relationship between two Louisiana domicili-
aries.
Lex loci delicti has also been used to deny recovery in suits by a
guest passenger against his driver for his alleged negligence in causing
an accident. Although Louisiana law would allow recovery on the
proof of ordinary negligence,8 many states grant a cause of action only
for willful and wanton negligence.' In cases involving only Louisiana
residents injured in a foreign state with such a rule, Louisiana courts
5. McDaniel v. Petroleum Hel., Inc., 455 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1972); Fry v. Lamb
Rent. Tools, Inc., 275 F. Supp. 283 (W.D. La. 1967); Johnson v. St. Paul Mercury Ins.
Co., 256 La. 289, 236 So. 2d 216 (1970); Williams v. Petroleum Hel., Inc., 234 So. 2d
522 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1970); Nicholson v. Atlas Assur. Corp., 156 So. 2d 245 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1963); Blount v. Blount, 125 So. 2d 66 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1960); Cone v. Smith,
76 So. 2d 46 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1954).
6. McDaniel v. Petroleum Hel., Inc., 455 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1972); McNeal v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 269 So. 2d 499 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1972), rev'd, 278 So.
2d 108 (1973); Williams v. Petroleum Hel., Inc., 234 So. 2d 522 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1972).
7. Nicholson v. Atlas Assur. Corp., 156 So. 2d 245 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963); Burke
v. Massachusetts Bond. & Ins. Co., 19 So. 2d 647 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1944), aff'd, 209
La. 495, 24 So. 2d 875 (1946). Louisiana does recognize the wife's cause of action
against the husband's insurer; under the direct action statute the insurer may not rely
upon defenses which are merely personal to its insured, such as interspousal immunity.
8. Johnson v. St. Paul Mercurs Ins. Co., 256 La. 289, 311, 236 So. 2d 216, 224
(1970) (dissenting opinion); Sears v. Interurban Transp. Co., Inc., 125 So. 748 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1930).




following lex loci delicti have consistently denied recovery by requir-
ing the higher degree of negligence.'
Defenses to the merits of a suit are also considered an element
of substantive law, and thus they too would be determined by the law
of the place of the wrong." The element of damages and legal interest
also came under the rule of lex loci delicti as part of the body of
substantive law.' 2 The foreign law would determine not only what
rate of interest should be awarded, but also at what point in the
litigation it should begin to accrue. 3 The foreign law would also be
adopted by Louisiana courts to determine the proper parties to bring
a cause of action, especially under wrongful death statutes. 4
The Direct Action Statute
Although lex loci delicti required the application of the substan-
tive law of the state where the wrong occurred, the forum was to apply
its own procedural law. This was illustrated in Honeycutt v. Indiana
Lumbermans Mutual Insurance Co., 15 where a Louisiana court ap-
plied Texas' Guest Statute requiring wanton negligence, but refused
to apply Texas' Dead Man Statute, which would have excluded the
testimony of one of the parties to the accident. The court ruled that,
"[slince the matter before the court was one of procedure relating
to matters of evidence, the rules of evidence in this state should
prevail."6
10. Johnson v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 256 La. 289, 236 So. 2d 216 (1970);
Sullivan v. Hardware Mut. Cas. Co., 260 So. 2d 35 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1972), remanded,
278 So. 2d 30 (1973); Orestiadou v. Succession of Andrews, 236 So. 2d 884 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1970); Blanchard v. Blanchard, 180 So. 2d 564 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965); Honey-
cutt v. Indiana Lbr. Mut. Ins. Co., 130 So. 2d 770 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961); Blount v.
Blount, 125 So. 2d 66 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1960); Cone v. Smith, 76 So. 2d 46 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1954).
11. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 388 (1934). Thus in Smith v, Northern
Insurance Co., 120 So. 2d 309 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1960), a finding that the driver of
the automobile was guilty of wanton negligence precluded the defense of contributory
negligence, following the decisions of the Alabama courts, the state where the accident
occurred.
12. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 412 (1934). See Fry v. Lamb Rent. Tools,
Inc., 275 F. Supp. 283 (W.D. La. 1967); Petroleum Prod. Corp. v. Sklar, 87 F. Supp.
715 (W.D. La. 1949); Holmes v. Barclay, 4 La. Ann. 63 (1849); Smith v. Northern Ins.
Co., 120 So. 2d 309 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1960).
13. Williams v. Petroleum Hel., Inc., 234 So. 2d 522 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1970);
Holmes v. Barclay, 4 La. Ann. 63 (1849).
14. Fry v. Lamb Rent. Tools, Inc., 275 F. Supp. 283 (W.D. La. 1967); Mock v.
Maryland Cas. Co., 6 So. 2d 199 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1942).
15. 130 So. 2d 770 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961).
16. Id. at 772.
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Since the courts would apply Louisiana's laws when only a proce-
dural matter was involved, the characterization of a right as either
procedural or substantive could produce significant results. That pro-
cess of characterization has produced a great deal of litigation con-
cerning Louisiana's Direct Action Statute.17 The courts have strug-
gled with the question of whether the right of direct action was a
remedial one, in which case it could be enforced in Louisiana regard-
less of the place of the injury, or if it was to be interpreted as creating
a new and substantive cause of action against the insurer. In the
latter instance, lex loci delicti would demand that it be applied only
in cases of injuries occurring within the state. This uncertainty"8 in
the law was resolved by the Louisiana supreme court in 1967 in Webb
v. Zurich Insurance Company." In an exhaustive review of the prior
jurisprudence and the statutory history of the right of direct action,
the court concluded that there was a clearly expressed public policy
to "make a fund directly available to one injured as a result of the
acts of the insured, provided there are minimum contacts in Louis-
iana."2" In the court's opinion there would certainly be those mini-
mum contacts when the injury occurred in Louisiana; when the injury
occurred outside of the state the Direct Action Statute could still
apply, provided there was some contact between the parties and this
state.2 It is notable that the Webb case did not follow the traditional
dichotomy of Louisiana conflicts cases between substantive and pro-
17. LA. R.S. 22:655 (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1950, No. 541: "The injured
person or his or her survivors or heirs hereinabove referred to, at their option, shall have
a right of direct action against the insurer within the terms and limits of the policy;
and such action may be brought against the insurer alone, or against both the insured
and the insurer jointly and in solido, in the parish in which the accident or injury
occurred, or in the parish in which an action could be brought against either the
insured or the insurer under the general rules of venue prescribed by Art. 42, Code of
Civil Procedure. This right of direct action shall exist whether the policy of insurance
sued upon was written or delivered in the State of Louisiana or not and whether or
not such policy contains a provision forbidding such direct action, provided the acci-
dent or injury occurred within the State of Louisiana."
18. For a brief history of the direct action statute see Webb v. Zurich Insurance
Co., 251 La. 558, 205 So. 2d 398 (1967), and the cases cited therein.
19. 251 La. 558, 205 So. 2d 398 (1967).
20. Id. at 568-69, 205 So. 2d at 402. (Emphasis added.) The court referred to
Morrison v. New Hampshire Insurance Co., 249 La. 546, 187 So. 2d 729 (1966), for its
reliance upon "minimum contacts."
21. The court found more than the minimum requirement in Webb "when the
policy was secured in this state; from an agent of the insurer that was doing business
in this state; was secured by an insured domiciled in this state; was issued for the
specific purpose of protecting the public generally, including the plaintiffs, and who




cedural rights. Rather, the emphasis was placed upon the interest of
the state in extending this right to as many persons as possible.
Dissatisfaction with Lex Loci Delicti
Although lex loci delicti had received criticism,22 it had never
been rejected by a Louisiana court of appeal prior to Johnson v. St.
Paul Mercury Insurance Co. 3 Johnson involved an action for personal
injuries by a guest passenger against his driver's insurer. Only Louis-
iana citizens were involved. However, because the accident occurred
in Arkansas, the Arkansas Guest Statute24 was applied, and because
no proof was made of willful or wanton negligence, the case was
dismissed. The court of appeal reversed, refusing to follow lex loci
delicti. Relying on the language of Webb which approved the direct
action whenever there were minimum contacts with the state, the
court found that there were "more than the minimum contacts with
Louisiana"2 ' to enable the court to assert jurisdiction over the parties,
and to apply Louisiana's law in deciding the case.
The minimum contacts formula offered a very rational solution
in this case, and could have provided a foundation for further devel-
opment in later cases. However, as persuasive as that opinion may
have been, it was not accepted by the Louisiana supreme court. In
reversing," the court noted that lex loci delicti afforded a certainty
of application and result which had become the "settled law" of the
state which would not be "abandoned without some compelling rea-
son." The court specifically refused to abandon lex loci delicti until
a new rule could be formulated which would be equally workable.
Jagers-The False Conflict of Laws
Jagers v. Royal Indemnity Co.27 was a suit by a Louisiana resi-
dent against her son and her son's insurer for injuries resulting from
an automobile accident in Mississippi. The trial court followed
Johnson in applying the substantive law of Mississippi and allowed
recovery because it did not find that Mississippi law would have
barred the suit. The defendant appealed, assigning as error that Mis-
22. Blanchard v. Blanchard, 180 So. 2d 564 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965)(concurring
opinion).
23. 218 So. 2d 375 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1969), rev'd, 256 La. 289, 236 So. 2d 216
(1970).
24. ARK. STATS. § 75-913 (1957).
25. 218 So. 2d 375, 382 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1969), rev'd, 256 La. 289, 236 So. 2d 216
(1970).
26. Johnson v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 256 La. 289, 236 So. 2d 216 (1970).
27. 276 So. 2d 309 (La. 1973).
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sissippi did have a rule of intra-family immunity which would have
required dismissal of the suit. Although the supreme court indicated
that Mississippi law would not prohibit this suit, it preferred instead
to apply Louisiana law which would allow the parent's suit. In aban-
doning lex loci delicti the court noted that this case involved only
Louisiana residents whose sole connection with Mississippi was the
accident. The court found this to be a "false conflict of laws question"
which is presented "when it is found that only a single state has an
interest in the application of the law, and that the other state in-
volved has no interest in the application of its law in the case.""8 The
factors which would give a state a basis to apply its laws under this
analysis presumably would include the citizenship of the parties,
their intention to return to the state, the place where the insurance
contract was made, and perhaps the registration of the vehicle in that
state. 9 The fact of an accident occurring within the state would not
of itself be sufficient to give the state the right to apply its laws,
especially when none of the parties intended to remain there, to bring
suit there, or to involve citizens of that state in litigation.
Thus, the Jagers decision would demand a different result in
cases involving only Louisiana residents where relief would be denied
merely because of the law of the state where the accident occurred.30
The recognition that only Louisiana has an interest in the rights and
obligations of the resident parties would allow effectuation of Louis-
iana's law of granting recovery in interspousal or guest passenger
cases.
However, a question not presented in Jagers is what analysis the
courts are to adopt in deciding cases in which two or more states have
substantial contacts with the transaction. Although Jagers specifi-
cally discards the use of lex loci delicti in "false conflict" cases only,
the majority's criticism of that rule is broad in scope, and leaves little
reason to suppose that it will be considered valid in any conflicts
problem. The opinion does not specifically adopt any of the particular
conflicts formulas which it had rejected in Johnson,3' but it does rely
28. Id. at 311. The concept of the "false conflict" was taken from the work of
Professor Brainerd Currie. See Couch, Choice-of-Law, Guest Statutes, and the Louis-
iana Supreme Court: Six Judges in Search of a Rulebook, 45 TuL. L. Rzv. 100, 106
(1970).
29. Sullivan v. Hardware Mut. Cas. Co., 278 So. 2d 30, 31 (La. 1973); Jagers v.
Royal Ind. Co., 276 So. 2d 309, 310 (La. 1973).
30. See Romero v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 277 So. 2d 649 (La. 1973);
Note, 48 TuL. L. REV. 149 (1973).
31. The court criticized as deficient: the "grouping of contacts" theory of Babcock
v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 191 N.E.2d 279 (1963); the "most signifi-
cant relationship" theory of the Restatement (Second); the "proper law" theory of
[Vol. 34
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upon the Restatement (Second) for certain principles to be applied
in the determination of the applicable law:
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,
(b) the relevant policies of the forum,
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the rela-
tive interests of those states in the determination of the particular
issue,
(d) the protection of justified expectations,
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be
applied.2
In weighing the facts of each case in the light of those principles,
Louisiana need not adopt the position of the Restateme nt (Second)
which looks to the state with the "most significant relationship"33 to
the case, nor the "center of gravity" or "grouping of contacts" 4 test
of other jurisdictions. Perhaps a further development of the "mini-
mum contacts" formula of Webb and Johnson would yield a suitable
framework. Previously the minimum contacts requirement seemed to
be satisfied by mere numbers of contacts, but after Jagers the number
would not be as crucial as their relative importance to the states and
parties involved. The desire to give effect to relevant state policies
and governmental interests would be of major concern and would
probably be decisive in many cases. In guest passenger and intra-
family suits, this would often result in the application of the law of
the state where the relationship was centered because of that state's
continuing interest in regulating that particular relationship. This
proposition draws support from Jagers and the later case of Sullivan
v. Hardware Mutual Casualty Co. 5 in which the domicile of the
parties was stressed as an extremely important consideration.
Professor Morris; the "governmental interest" theory of Brainerd Currie; and, the rule
of the "place where the car is permanently garaged" suggested by Professor
Ehrenzweig.
32. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1969).
33. Id. § 145.
34. Babcock v. Jackson, 12N.Y.2d 473, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 191 N.E.2d 279 (1963).
The courts seem to use these two phrases synonymously. All three of these tests require
examination of the contacts which the case has with the particular states involved,
weighed on the basis of their importance and relevance to the issues in question. These
formulas offer great flexibility of application, and are particularly attuned to the policy
interests of the various states and rules of law since these will greatly influence the
judgment as to which contacts are most important.
35. 278 So. 2d 30 (La. 1973).
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The exact formula by which choice of law principles are to be
weighed need not be articulated now. The immediate replacement of
one mechanical rule by another would not be the most prudent way
of making this transition. Rather, a method for balancing the rele-
vant choice of law factors should be evolved on a case by case basis.
Workmen's Compensation
The Louisiana Workmen's Compensation Act 3 does not offer any
specific guidance for its application in conflict of laws questions.
However, in cases involving injuries out of state, or employment rela-
tionships created out of state, Louisiana courts have been inclined to
administer the Act as liberally as possible in favor of an injured
workman.
The Louisiana court of appeal in Hargis v. McWilliams Co. 7
determined that Louisiana compensation benefits should be granted
for injuries suffered outside of the state when the employment con-
tract was created in the state." The argument that the Act should
have no extraterritorial effect was rejected by the court. The court
emphasized the contractual nature" of the cause of action and effec-
tively dismissed the importance of the place of the injury in the
determination of the permissible application of the law.40
The question arose in Johnson v. El Dorado Creosoting Co.4"
whether Louisiana's Compensation Law could be applied to an injury
36. LA. R.S. 23:1021-1351 (1950).
37. 119 So. 88 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1928).
38. Accord Mattel v. Pittman Const. Co., 248 La. 540, 180 So. 2d 696 (1965);
Ohlhausen v. Sternberg Dred. Co., 218 La. 677, 50 So. 2d 803 (1951); Welch v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 225 So. 2d 623 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1969); Brooks v. Griggs Casing
Crews, Inc., 136 So. 2d 693 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961); Cobb v. International Paper Co.,
76 So. 2d 460 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1954); Williams v. Travelers Ins. Co., 19 So. 2d 586
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1944); RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 398 (1934).
39. The right of compensation granted an injured employee has been recognized
as arising from the contract of employment rather than from any theory of tort. Thus
the Act provides that its benefits will not apply "unless prior to the injury they [the
employer and employee] have so elected by agreement, either express or implied, as
hereinafter provided." LA. R.S. 23:1038 (1950). However, it is further provided that any
contract of hiring will "be presumed to have been made subject to the provisions [of
the actl, unless there is as a part of the contract an express statement in writing" to
the contrary. LA. R.S. 23:1039 (1950).
40. The court stated that "[it is immaterial under the act where the work has
to be done; the law looks to the workman, not to the place where the work is done.
The workman is not deprived of the protection of the law because the work is done
outside of Louisiana." Hargis v. McWilliams Co., 119 So. 88, 89 (La. App. Orl. Cir.
1928).
41. 71 So. 2d 613 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1954).
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occurring in Louisiana when the contract of employment had been
made out of state. In considering this problem, the court relied upon
the United States Supreme Court decision of Pacific Employers Ins.
Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission.42 In Pacific the Supreme
Court had refused to apply the full faith and credit clause so as to
require California, the state of the injury, to defer from administering
its own law in favor of the law of Massachusetts, where the employ-
ment contract had been made. It did not construe the full faith and
credit clause to demand that a state forbear from exercising its
constitutional authority. . . to legislate for the bodily safety and
economic protection of employees injured within it. Few matters
could be deemed more appropriately the concern of the state in
which the injury occurs or more completely within its power.
4 3
The Court found the interests of Massachusetts in regulating con-
tracts made in the state, and of California in providing for the com-
pensation of persons injured there to be equally valid; thus, there was
no constitutional bar to the application by the forum of its law.
Following that reasoning, the Louisiana court in Johnson allowed
recovery under Louisiana's Compensation Law when the injury oc-
curred within the state. The recognized interest of Louisiana in the
safety of persons within the state, as well as the possibility that a
person injured here might require aid at the public expense was held
sufficient grounds for coverage by Louisiana's law."
Louisiana decisions.have upheld the application of Louisiana's
Compensation Law when it is the situs of either the injury or of the
contract of employment. In addition, four grounds have been sug-
gested upon which a state could also be found to have a legitimate
interest in applying its law, when it is the
place where the employment relation exists or is carried out;
place where the industry is localized;
place where the employee resides; or
place whose statute the parties expressly adopted by contract. 5
The right of a state to apply its compensation law has been
upheld when it is the location of an injury" or of the contract of
employment47 ; thus, the situation may arise in which an employee
42. 306 U.S. 493 (1930).
43. Id. at 503.
44. Accord Lisenby v. Tibbits, 225 F. Supp. 870 (W.D. La. 1963), aff'd, Lisenby
v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 327 F.2d 665 (5th Cir. 1964).
45. 3 LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 86.10 (1973).
46. Johnson v. El Dorado Creosoting Co., 71 So. 2d 613 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1954).
47. Hargis v. McWilliams Co., 119 So. 88 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1928).
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may have a choice as to which state's remedy he will pursue.
Moreover, he may accept benefits from one state and later attempt
to claim further benefits from another state. In Magnolia Petroleum
Co. v. Hunt"0 the United States Supreme Court seemed to indicate
that such later suit would be barred under the full faith and credit
clause by a judgment from the first state if that law declared that it
was to be the sole remedy of the workman. On the basis of that
decision a Louisiana court of appeal dismissed a claim of compensa-
tion in Griffin v. Universal Underwriters Insurance Co."0 on an excep-
tion of res judicata since plaintiff had previously secured a final
award from the Texas Industrial Accident Board. The supreme court
reversed50 on the authority of the United States Supreme Court deci-
sion in Industrial Commission of Wisconsin v. McCartin.' The court
noted that McCartin limited Hunt in holding that a successive suit
would be barred only when the original award was made under a law
plainly purporting to be exclusive of any remedy in any other state.
The provision of the Texas Compensation Statute declaring it to be
the exclusive remedy of the injured employee was construed to mean
only that the compensation award was to be exclusive of any other
remedy within that state. Thus failing to find anything in the Texas
law designed to preclude further recovery in another state, the court
declared that Louisiana would be free to grant compensation under
its own laws after allowing a credit for the amount of the Texas
award.
Once an award has been granted under Louisiana's Compensa-
tion Law, the grant remains subject to all the provisions of the Act,
regardless of whether the claimant later leaves the state. Thus in
Festervand v. Laster" an award made to the widow of a worker killed
in the course of Louisiana employment was held exempt from gar-
nishment as provided by the Louisiana Act.53 Even though she was
then a Texas resident, the court found that the exemption from gar-
nishment did not specifically limit that benefit to Louisiana resi-
dents.
In those cases in which the Louisiana Compensation Law is not
applicable, the plaintiff may ask the court to award relief under
another state's law. If the other state channels compensation claims
through an administrative agency the Louisiana court will dismiss
48. 320 U.S. 430 (1943).
49. 268 So. 2d 702 (La. App. lst Cir. 1972).
50. 283 So. 2d 748 (La. 1973).
51. 330 U.S. 622 (1947).
52. 130 So. 634 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1930).
53. LA. R.S. 23:1205 (1950.
[Vol. 34
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the case because it lacks the machinery to administer the appropriate
relief.54 However, if the other state's compensation claims are judi-
cially handled the Louisiana courts feel competent to grant the reme-
dies prescribed under the foreign law.15 The desirability of such a
result is questionable. At least one writer has suggested that the mere
fact that another state's compensation law is judicially administered
is not enough to guarantee that Louisiana courts will be able to "pro-
vide substantially all of the remedy guaranteed by the foreign stat-
ute."" It has been further suggested that the test in such cases should
not be merely the method of the administration of the compensation
law, but whether, in each particular case, the court possesses the
power to grant substantially the same compensation as the worker





54. Smith v. Continental Nat. Am. Group, 321 F. Supp. 1354 (E.D. La. 1971);
Mattel v. Pittman Const. Co., 174 So. 2d 141 (La. App. 4th Cir.), rev'd on other
grounds, 248 La. 540, 180 So. 2d 696 (1965); Woodham v. Travelers Ins. Co., 161 So.
2d 368 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964).
55. Smith v. Globe Ind. Co., 243 So. 2d 882 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1971); Babineaux
v. Southeastern Drill. Corp., 170 So. 2d 518 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965).
56. Larson, Constitutional Law-Conflicts and Workmen's Compensation, 1971
DUKE L.J. 1037, 1044.
57. Id. at 1043-45.
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